Philosophy

The CEU Department of Philosophy will be celebrating the contribution to philosophy of István Bodnár, in the year of his 61st birthday, with a one-day symposium.

PROGRAM

Morning Session
Location: N11 616

9.30 Rob Bolton, Rutgers University: Dialectic and Analytics: Aristotle's Two Standards for Inquiry

10.30 Coffee break

11.00 Orna Harari, Tel Aviv University: Mathematicians, Metaphysics, and the Principles of Demonstration

Abstract

According to what we could call the Perceptual Account of Mindreading (PA), appropriately endowed observers are sometimes able to visually perceive that someone is angry. In this talk, I first explore the merits and limitations of the main strategies that have been employed to defend PA. Subsequently, I present and defend a version of PA, according to which some mental properties can be observational properties.

Abstract: My aim in this talk is to introduce a view that I call transcendental naïve realism. According to naïve realist theories of perception, perceptual experiences are relational. Transcendental naïve realism involves adopting a particular meta-philosophical attitude towards the naïve realist theory of perception: it involves regarding the naïve realist theory of perception from a transcendental stand-point, as providing an account of ‘how it is possible’ that perceptual experience has the distinctive charactertistics that it does.

The nature of value and the development of virtue in the framework of the subjective/objective distinction as it is used by Kierkegaard.

Mind-body dualism underwent a renaissance in the last part of the twentieth century. Several arguments challenged the capacity of physicalism to accommodate mental phenomena, especially conscious experience. Dualism was widely considered the leading alternative. Since then, sophisticated responses to arguments against physicalism have been developed, and nonphysicalist views other than dualism, including idealism and Russellian monism have received renewed interest.

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I explore the relationship between relativism and feminist epistemologies, by evaluating the arguments of four epistemologists who takes themselves to be feminists. I argue that some feminist views that are supposed to be absolutist are actually relativist, and that some relativist views that are supposed to be conservative actually serve feminist goals. My tentative conclusions is that (at least some) feminist epistemologies can, and should, be understood as relativist.

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