I begin with some recent remarks of Brandom's on indexicals, remarks intended to illustrate how we can be misled by a "representationalist paradigm" into asking inappropriate metaphysical questions, rather than questions about the use of certain forms of language. I argue that the lessons that Brandom and others see as obvious in the indexical case may apply much more widely, with the same broadly anti-metaphysical consequences; and that Brandom himself should certainly take this to be the case.
The paper argues that substances, though emergent, are fundamental in the ontology; and that each special science carves its own set of substances in nature.
The phenomenon of confabulation is receiving increasing philosophical attention, and its relationship with self-interpretation and deliberation in the light of its epistemic costs and benefits are controversial in the literature. Here I start developing an account of confabulation that is compatible with the empirical evidence by focusing on one form of confabulation, that is, confabulatory explanations for one’s own attitudes and choices.
After receiving the Academic Achievement Award for First-Year Doctoral Students in 2013, Anton Markoc has now been awarded the Award for Advanced Doctoral Students for the 2014/2015 academic year.
Congratulations, Anton and good luck with your further work!
Organized Jointly by the Department of Philosophy, Central European University (CEU) and the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS)
Tuesday, 24th March, 2015 CEU, Zrínyi utca 14, Room 412
Starting January 2015, our Alumna, Alina Asavei is appointed Postdoctoral Researcher within the Center for Collective Memory at Charles University, Prague. Her research topic will be, "Communism, Holocaust and the Politics of Memory in Europe".
SUN is a meeting place for academics and professionals eager to look beyond their disciplinary boundaries. Students are exposed to an immense diversity of countries, disciplines, and perspectives, and have the opportunity to discuss issues openly in an atmosphere of tolerance and intellectual curiosity.
I try to demonstrate a possible contribution of philosophy to the sciences by exposing conceptual confusions in Libet’s empirical work on free will. The elimination of these confusions show that his research failed to establish what he claimed it does.