Abstract: Wrong kind of reasons (WKR) objections to fitting-attitude analysis of value, as well as the
very idea of the wrong kind of reasons, can be defused by paying close attention to the attitudes that
are posited or imagined by scenarios, e.g., in which we are told that an evil demon will punish us with
extreme pain unless they admire him. My argument, based on considerations relation to the role proattitudes
must play in defeasible practical inference, is that such attitudes are strictly impossible. If the
attitudes are impossible, then there cannot be reasons for them. A fortiori there can be no wrong kind
of reasons for them.
I also provide a diagnosis of the standard approach to WKR objections. Such approaches focus
on trying to sort reasons into the right and wrong kinds using some right- or wrong-making property. I
try to show, through a detailed analysis of two such attempts, why this won't work.