Keith Allen (University of York) - Transcendental Naïve Realism & the Problem of Consciousness

Type: 
Budapest colloquium talks
Audience: 
Open to the Public
Building: 
Nador u. 15
Room: 
103
Tuesday, January 15, 2019 - 3:30pm
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Date: 
Tuesday, January 15, 2019 - 3:30pm to 5:00pm

Abstract: My aim in this talk is to introduce a view that I call transcendental naïve realism. According to naïve realist theories of perception, perceptual experiences are relational. Transcendental naïve realism involves adopting a particular meta-philosophical attitude towards the naïve realist theory of perception: it involves regarding the naïve realist theory of perception from a transcendental stand-point, as providing an account of ‘how it is possible’ that perceptual experience has the distinctive charactertistics that it does. This talk motivates transcendental naïve realism by considering how it provides a way of addressing the problem of consciousness.