Title: Is change normatively required?
Abstract:
This paper discusses whether rationality, morality, or prudence impose process-requirements upon us, i.e. requirements that demand of us to change. It has been argued that process-requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral, or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process-requirements. First, process-requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality, or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality, or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process-requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process-requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality, or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral, or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process-requirements.