Abstract:
In Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, perception is not just one issue among others. The analysis of perception largely determines the way other philosophical issues, such as consciousness, time, language or ideal objects, should be approached. Merleau-Ponty repeatedly affirms the priority of perceiving, as, for instance, in his 1946 lecture The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences or in his masterpiece Phenomenology of Perception (1945), where he regards perception as our “primordial knowledge” of the real. In my work on Merleau-Ponty, I do two things: (1.) I try to state as clearly as possible the meaning of the primacy of perception, and (2.) its philosophical consequences.
I proceed in three steps. Since the thesis of the primacy of perception – in all its possible meanings – presupposes a certain idea of what perception is, I briefly outline Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception. Secondly, I come back to the primacy of perception thesis. I propose to distinguish three possible meanings. This allows us to formulate our question more precisely. Thirdly, I focus on one area of application of Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental thesis, viz. his analysis of consciousness. I will interpret his claim: “All consciousness is, in some measure, perceptual consciousness.”