Type:
Lecture
Audience:
Open to the Public
Speaker:
Building:
Zrinyi u. 14
Room:
412
Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 5:30pm
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Date:
Tuesday, November 20, 2012 - 5:30pm to 7:30pm
Stephen Butterfill's main research is in philosophy of mind, with a focus on philosophical issues in developmental psychology. He is also interested in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of action. He is currently Associate Professor in philosophy.
He currently has individual and collaborative work in progress in four main areas: joint action; theory of mind and behaviour reading; categorical and speech perception, their relation to core knowledge; and sources of knowledge.
Abstract:
Shared agency is paradigmatically involved when two or more people paint a house together, tidy the toys away together, or lift a two-handled basket together. To characterise shared agency, some philosophers have appealed to a special kind of intention or structure of intention, knowledge or commitment often called 'shared intention'. In this talk I shall argue that fully characterising shared agency may additionally require appeal to motor representation. Shared agency is not only a matter of what we intend: sometimes it also depends on interlocking structures of motor representation. This may have consequences for some metaphysical, normative and phenomenological questions about shared agency.