Yet Another Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality

Type: 
Workshop
Audience: 
Open to the Public
Building: 
Nador u. 9, Monument Building
Room: 
Gellner (103)
Saturday, November 29, 2014 - 9:30am
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Date: 
Saturday, November 29, 2014 - 9:30am to Sunday, November 30, 2014 - 6:15pm

This workshop will bring together scholars from the US and Europe to discuss their work on the topic of phenomenal intentionality.  Intentionality is the property that most (if not all) mental states (such as thoughts and perceptions) have of being about something, or having representational content. Until fairly recently, the dominant approaches to intentionality in the analytic tradition attempted to reduce it to some kind of natural/causal relation between brain states and the world. Dissatisfaction with such theories has prompted a growing number of philosophers to explore a fundamentally different approach, on which intentionality is an essentially experiential phenomenon.  The basic idea is that intentional states of all kinds represent what they do in virtue of their intrinsic experiential character – their phenomenology.

Invited researchers will share their work on cutting-edge issues within this research program, such as the nature of conceptual experience (the experience of thinking), the contents of perceptual experience (e.g., which properties are represented within visual experience), unconscious intentionality, and the relation of phenomenal intentional content to reference.

The organisers gratefully acknowledge the generous support of the CEU Conferences and Academic Events Fund.

Please register to the workshop by sending an email to: jeney-domingueszs@ceu.hu.

Program

29 November

 

09:30 – 10:00.

Coffee

10:00 – 11:15.

Elisabetta Sacchi (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)
“Phenomenal Character and Experiential Aspectuality”

11:30 – 12:45.

Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)
“Phenomenal Intentionality with Compromise”

12:45 – 14:00.

Lunch break

14:00 – 15:15.

David Pitt (California State University LA, CEU-Fulbright Fellow)
“Unconscious Thought”

15:30 – 16:45.

Hanoch Ben-Yami (CEU)
"The Authority of Our Self-ascription of “Mental States”: Experiential Dead-ends and Conceptual Cleared Ways"

17:00 – 18:15.

Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp )
“Particularity and Cognitive Phenomenology”

30 November

 

09:30 – 10:00.

Coffee

10:00 – 11:15.

Marta Jorba (University College Dublin)
“Attitudinal Cognitive Phenomenology and the Horizon of Possibilities”

11:30 – 12:45. 

Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire)
“Unconscious Qualities as the Basis of Content”

12:45 – 14:00.

Lunch break

14:00 – 15:15.

Howard Robinson (CEU)
"What Cognitive Phenomenology Is, and Why the ‘Hard Problem’ Cannot be Confined to Qualia"

15:30 – 16:45. 

Anders Nes (University of Oslo)
“On Fore- and Background in Cognitive Phenomenology”

17:00 – 18:15.

Katalin Farkas (CEU)
“Phenomenal Character and Functional Role”