Feeling yourself. Depersonalization disorder and self awareness
I use evidence from psychiatric disorders involving the experience of depersonalisation to decompose the causal and cognitive structure of experiences reported as self-awareness. I combine insights from predictive coding theory and the appraisal theory of emotion to explain the association between hypoactivity in the Anterior Insula Cortex and depersonalization. This resolves a puzzle for some theories raised by the fact that reduced affective response in depersonalization is associated with normal interoception and activity in Posterior Insula Cortex. It also elegantly accounts for the role of anxiety in depersonalisation via the role of attention in predictive coding theories.
I consider whether and how this type of explanation is relevant to philosophical theories of the nature of self-awareness.
Craig, A. D. (2009). "How do you feel--now? the anterior insula and human awareness." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 10(1): 59-70.
Craig, A. D. (2010). "The sentient self." Brain Structure and Function 214(5): 563-577.
Critchley, H. D. (2005). "Neural mechanisms of autonomic, affective, and cognitive integration."
Journal of Comparative Neurology 493(1): 154-166. Dunn, B. D., H. C. Galton, et al. (2010). "Listening to your heart: how interoception shapes emotion experience and intuitive decision making." Psychological Science 21(12): 1835-1844.
Füstös, J., K. Gramann, et al. (2013). "On the embodiment of emotion regulation: interoceptive awareness facilitates reappraisal." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 8(8): 911-917.
Garfinkel, S. N. and H. D. Critchley (2013). "Interoception, emotion and brain: new insights link internal physiology to social behavior." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 8(3): 231-234.
Medford, N. (2012). "Emotion and the unreal self: depersonalization disorder and de-affectualization." Emotion Review 4(2): 139-144.