Philip Goff (University of Liverpool) - 'Cognitive Phenomenalism and the Trouble with Robust Realism about Thought'

The CEU Department of Philosophy cordially invites you to a talk

by

Philip Goff (University of Liverpool)

on

'Cognitive Phenomenalism and the Trouble with Robust Realism about Thought'

Friday, 30 May, 2014, 3.30 PM, Zrinyi 14, Room 412

ABSTRACT

There was a broad consensus in twentieth century analytic philosophy that thought and consciousness are distinct aspects of mentality, to be accounted for in different ways. In the twenty first century there is a growing enthusiasm for cognitive phenomenalism: the view that token thoughts are identical with, or directly grounded in, token states of consciousness. Robust realism about consciousness – the view that conscious states are intrinsic, categorical states of the subject – is plausible; and hence many cognitive phenomenalists are led to robust realism about thought – the view that token thoughts are intrinsic, categorical states of the thinker.

I raise two difficulties with robust realism about thought. Firstly, it has a deep difficulty explaining why thoughts tend to produce more or less rational behaviour with respect to their content. Secondly, it faces the indeterminacy problem: the challenge of explaining how thoughts get to be as determinate as they pre-theoretically appear to be. All theories of thought face the indeterminacy problem, but robust realism rules out one of the most promising approaches to solving it. There is a certain irony in this second difficulty, as proponents of phenomenal intentionality have claimed that their view solves the indeterminacy problem. I argue against this claim.