ABSTRACT
What makes a noise or a squiggle on a piece of paper a name of a thing? There has been, as of recent, a move by some proponents of direct reference theory (in some cases, even a pioneer proponent, such as David Kaplan) towards an account of naming and name using that grounds the reference of a use of a proper name in cognition. This is not a return to a straightforward, classical form of descriptivism or internalism, according to which conceptual material in the mind of the speaker fixes the reference of a use of a name. Neo-cognition advocates, applying something supposedly close to the spirit of Donnellan’s conception of having in mind, defend that reference starts with an object which is, so to speak, taken in by the mind, and it is the having in mind of an object that makes a use of a name refer to it. I will argue that having the referent in mind is neither necessary nor sufficient for a use of a name to refer to it, much in the way that a backup of definite descriptions was neither necessary nor sufficient for a use of a name to reach its referent. I will stress the essentially externalistic nature of the picture of reference that underlies direct reference theory, and I will reflect on some of the conditions a mere mark must satisfy to be a proper name.