ABSTRACT
Generally reasons to act in a certain way are also reasons to form an intention to do so, some philosophers think. At any rate, the fact that it would be good to have an intention when there is nothing to be said for acting as intended is no reason for forming an intention (or alternatively: it is a reason, but we can’t follow it). Intentions are like beliefs in that they cannot be formed for state-given reasons. However, according to an influential account of intentions – Bratman’s planning conception – intentions enable coordination with oneself and others. Intentions are useful in that regard. Thus the reasons for forming them would appear to be instrumental reasons of a certain kind – not unlike state-given reasons. There is a tension between the two approaches. I will argue that while the instrumental view of reasons to intend holds at least a partial truth, the symmetry claim of reasons to believe and reasons to intend misunderstands the dependence of intentions on reasons to act.