Ian Carter studied philosophy and politics in England at the Universities of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne (B.A.) and Manchester (M.A.), and in Italy at the European University Institute in Florence (PhD.). During 1992-3 he was Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Manchester. Since 1993, he has been a member of the Department of Political and Social Studies at the University of Pavia, where he is currently Associate Professor in Political Philosophy. In 2003 and 2012, he was a visiting researcher at the University of Oxford.
Abstract:
The debate over the value of distributive equality has mostly concerned attempts to argue for or against its intrinsic value. In this paper we argue against the intrinsic value of distributive equality but in favour of its "constitutive" value. Distributive equality has constitutive value because its occurrence is necessary for the justice of certain distributive outcomes. In the light of this account of the value of equality, we hope to show what is right and what is wrong in a number of alternative accounts, including those Raz, Kagan, Parfit, Frankfurt, Temkin and Christiano, as well as pointing out its implications for the relation between equality and responsibilty, and for the so-called "levelling down" objection.