Elisabeth is a senior researcher in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS, EHESS, ENS), affiliated with the Department of Cognitive Studies (DEC) at Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris. Her main interests are in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the philosophy of psychopathology and action theory. She has written a book on intentionality (Naturaliser l'intentionnalité, Paris, PUF, 1993), as well as a number of papers and book chapters in these domains. She is currently preparing a book on action. She is especially interested in the nature of action representations and intentions and in the relationship between agency and theory of mind. She is the co-organizer with Jérôme Dokic and Joëlle Proust of the Seminar on Action, Perception, Intentionality and Consciousness (APIC) at Institut Jean-Nicod. She is a member of the European Society of Analytic Philosophy (ESAP), the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP), the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) and the Société de Philosophie Analytique (SOPHA).
Abstract:
On a traditional philosophical view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In recent times, this traditional view has come under attack from both philosophers and cognitive scientists. Two main worries have been raised. The first worry concerns the causal efficacy of intentions qua conscious states. The second worry concerns the nature of the relation between intentions and action, and whether this relation is best described as a causal relation rather than as a control relation. Current scientific evidence provides strong support for the view that action is hierarchically organized and involves several levels of intentions, action representations and action control processes. I shall argue that the traditional philosophical view, but also some of the objections levelled against it, rest in part on an over-simplified conception of the structure of agency and that taking into account the hierarchical nature of intentions and control processes can lead to a reassessment of the relation between intentions and action and of the role of conscious agency in action production.