Throughout his works Aristotle claims that scientific knowledge is of universals. It is an important claim for him, because he holds that only of universals, and not of particulars, there are definitions, and definitions are at the basis of scientific knowledge. Moreover, he also characterizes other epistemic states, such as knowledge consisting in having experience, in contrast as being concerned with particulars.
Hasper will discuss two problems with this claim. First, if experience is of particulars, Aristotle’s idea that experience may concern universal propositions seems inconsistent – as it has indeed been held to be. Second, Aristotle’s claim that knowledge is of universals might get him into trouble, for he rejects the Platonic position that universals are ontologically primary and exist independently from particulars. Aristotle thus faces the difficulty of having to explain how scientific knowledge can be of universals without committing himself to independently existing universals and without reducing this knowledge of universals to knowledge of particulars.
Both problems can be solved, Hasper will argue, by taking seriously the context of proof in which Aristotle formulates his account of scientific knowledge. The concept of proof Aristotle presupposes is that of proof conducted in the case of an arbitrary individual. Hasper will discuss first Aristotle’s argument against the existence of Platonic Forms as an argument concerning the ontological status of this arbitrary individual: is it a universal or a particular? Then Hasper will show that with Aristotle’s account of such proofs it is possible to interpret his claim that scientific knowledge is of universals in such a way that it does not entail that forms of knowledge which are of particulars, cannot be universal and that it allows Aristotle to maintain the ontological primacy of particulars without reducing scientific knowledge to some form of knowledge of particulars.