Abstracts

Boros
Among Dilthey’s late fragments there is an exciting description of what can be interpreted both as the systematically first moment of the awakening of consciousness and as the elevation of an individual person and an individual object at once from the unstoppable flow of life. This elevation does not remain a solitary one. The person perceives itself as the identical subject of elevations as opposed to the plurality of the objects. It experiences itself as the active pole that generates connection. At the same time, it attempts to grasp itself by connecting the moments of elevation (Erlebnisse) as coherent parts of a whole, i.e. her life as a whole. This connection takes place in the form of what can be called the existential meaning of the hermeneutical circle. However, this scheme is not pre-given. Everyone has to struggle for an acceptable interpretation of the moments of her life connecting them to form a whole that can provide the hoped-for sense of life at least provisionally.
At the same time – completing the picture provided by Dilthey and his pupil Misch – one must emphasise that the existential meaning of self-interpretation in the frame of the hermeneutical circle is far from being a simple cognitive act or series of acts. The self-interpretational narratives both contain references to emotions and legitimise emotions triggered by the appearance of Ereignis-like occurrences among the moments of life to be rendered meaningful. I will interpret the appearance of this special sort of existential emotions in the wake of W. Schmitt-Biggemann’s analyses of the concept of Ereignis in his book Geschichte wissen. Afterwards, I will add a sample of how the narrative hermeneutical interpretation of emotions can be generalized making use of some theorems of R. de Sousa and P. Goldie.

Cabestan
It has to be said that Freud’s way of thinking has already lost a part of its credit. However, it’s certainly not a reason to claim that the hypothesis of the unconscious is null and void. Therefore, I’m going in my talk to examine whether and how it’s possible to keep Freud’s hypothesis. So, I would like first to remind you of Heidegger’s criticism, which is based on an ontological argument, according to which natural phenomena belong to one form of being whereas human phenomena belong to another. It means you can’t think and speak of a human behaviour as if it was a physical or chemical process. Then, I want to consider Sartre’s concept of bad faith. For Sartre is convinced that, for instance, the hysteric is aware of what he doesn’t want to be aware
of and, as long as he tries to escape from it, he is necessarily aware of what he tries to escape from. But the concept of bad faith can’t be the only explanation of the human behaviours and we have to make room for an unconscious intention, which doesn’t imply that we consider the unconscious as a noun (MacIntyre) or as a thing in-it-self (Sartre). Finally, from an interrogation on Leonardo’s homosexuality and the paradigm of the negative theology, I’m going to sketch the idea of a negative psychology from the idea that it’s worth keeping silent when the unconscious is at stake rather than deceiving oneself by storytelling.

Cartlidge
Throughout his career, Heidegger made extensive and often critical remarks about anthropology, constantly insisting that his work essentially differs from it. In this paper, I object to this view and argue, by looking at his analysis of moods, that Heidegger’s contains an interesting kind of philosophical anthropology despite his own estimation of it. The way anthropology usually operates is by investigating specific human societies or phenomena, cataloguing and comparing them. The emphasis in anthropological research is usually placed on bringing out the historical and cultural specificities of instantiations of human societies and analysing the differences between them. Philosophical anthropology, on the other hand, aims to discover what is common to all instantiations of human existence and ascertaining what is constitutive for it, the essential features that make it what it is. But Heidegger argued that a more fundamental analysis must be carried out before any other kind of philosophical enquiry can take place. For anything like a philosophical anthropology to be possible, ‘fundamental ontology’ must take place, which begins in an analysis of Dasein – the only entity for which the question of the meaning of ‘Being’ arises. Heidegger argues that, because Dasein is in principle not limited to human being, this makes his analysis of it fundamentally different from and essentially prior to philosophical anthropology. This claim can be shown to be incorrect in several ways by analysing Heidegger’s work, but a powerful one can be found in his treatment of moods. Heidegger identifies mood as a necessary, universal and constitutive feature of human existence that plays a significant role in the disclosure of information about a human’s existence to itself. Moods not only reveal information about our existence to us, but allow the things in our existence to be revealed to us in different ways. Furthermore, the ways of revealing that moods bring to us are held to be more fundamental than (and required for) the perhaps more stereotypical ways in which information can be revealed to us: science, thinking, deduction, etc. Moods precede these kinds of phenomena and must be already operative within
our existence to make them possible. Heidegger’s analysis of moods makes significant claims about the fundamental structure of human existence – it is thus a productive kind of philosophical anthropology.

Höfele
According to Kant, the feeling of the sublime (Erhabene) as a negative pleasure (negative Lust), which is ignited by something that is great above all comparison, arises primarily in the face of raw nature. The sublime thus seems irrelevant at first glance if the technological possibilities of man in modernity are equal to or even surpass the power of nature, and if the present epoch is understood as Anthropocene, in which man dominates and completely permeates animate as well as inanimate nature. Against this background and following recent debates, the paper explores the question of whether it is appropriate to speak of a techno-sublime (Technisch-Erhabene) in modern times. It will be shown that even modern technology, when alienated from humanity, can supply the function attributed by Kant to the ‘dynamic sublime (Dynamisch-Erhabene)’ insofar as it transcends not only the work of nature but also that of the human. According to this concept, the sublime allows “a faculty to resist of a quite different kind (ein Vermögen zu widerstehen von ganz anderer Art)” (KU, AA 5, 261) to be discovered in us and thus, in the sense of Schiller, dialectically brings the ‘moral autonomy (moralische Selbständigkeit)’ of the subject to light.

Hühn
In a first step, the paper will show how Schopenhauer uses his theory of the essential identity of all living beings, which is founded on his voluntarist metaphysics and orients itself on the criterium of the capacity to suffer, in order to problematize the anthropocentric primacy of reason for the grounding of morals. In a second step, the paper attempts to provide evidence that, despite accepting the negativity of suffering without illusions, it is probable that Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion extends to a horizon of possibility articulated in the medium of that which should not be. The paper’s critical central thesis is finally that the fundamental contradiction of the ethics of compassion is condensed in the figure of the ascetic. The sense of release (Gelassenheit) demanded by the negation of the will excludes the normative reference to the other which Schopenhauer had once indicated as the mainspring of moral action.
Kim

The emotions that are dealt with regularly in Existentialism are angst, guilt, fear, and perhaps shame and such. This is because the core of the understanding of human existence is profoundly related to the finiteness of human existence. Furthermore, the influence of the Christian theological interpretation of human existence on Existentialism is undeniable, whether it was fighting or embracing the ideas of the Christian tradition. Either way, the emotions that were highlighted in existential philosophy or other fields of philosophy did not go further beyond the scope of these certain emotions. I attempt to examine other emotions that have been rather neglected in traditional philosophy, such as gratitude and forgiveness, and show how these emotions are fundamentally related to the understanding of our existence.

Olay

In my talk I discuss three paradigmatic thinkers of alienation: Rousseau, Marx, and Lukács. With regard to Rousseau, I examine more closely the structure of what might be called his precursor conception of alienation. By this I mean that alienation in a broad sense could be and has been understood in Rousseau as an analysis of “social pathologies” in the sense of the development of modern society. However, alienation in this sense has the structure of possession and subsequent disappropriation of man’s original constitution. If we take a closer look at Rousseau in the light of a more specific concept of based on the theory of Marx, it can be pointed out that there is a general structure of alienation that might be described with the possession – disappropriation – reappropriation formula. With regard to Rousseau, I claim that he has a simplified version of alienation in the form of hypothetical possession – disappropriation.

The discussion of Rousseau already implies a look at Marx’ theory of alienation which I develop in the second part of my paper. In Marx’s work we find a shift from alienation in the early Paris Manuscripts (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte) to reification/objectification in the later work (Kritik der politischen Ökonomie). It is debated whether this means a break in the treatment of, or even abandoning the issue, or rather implies the presence of the topic in the whole work. Be it as it may, I claim that normative basis of alienation in the early Marx is the concept of man’s self-realization in the working process. The self-realization, in turn, takes place in a double movement of a prior objectification and a following re-appropriation.
The last part of my argumentation is dedicated to Lukács’s theory of reification in *History and Class Consciousness* which proved to be one of the most influential of his ideas. His contribution to the theory of alienation has also often been seen in his concept of reification (*Verdinglichung*). I discuss Lukács’s critique of capitalist society within the Marxist tradition with an eye on how the concept of reification partly carries on and partly modifies the conception of alienated labour as a basic tenet of Marx’s thought. In this respect, I take into account that Lukács could not read Marx’s *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* that was not published until nine years later. The paper shows that Lukács could not clarify how non-alienated conditions should be conceived – a problem even recent descriptions of alienation (Hartmut Rosa, Jaeggi) could not solve either.

Weberman

My aim in this paper is to make more precise the idea of an existential emotion. I want to explain exactly what it might mean to say that there is a subset of emotions which qualify as existential. The framework for my analysis follows Heidegger’s account in *Being and Time*. While I follow Heidegger’s account, I’ll be emending the vocabulary, probing it in certain ways that he himself does not and building on it to reach some new insights. In fact, my central question about which emotions are existential and what makes them so, uses the term “existential” differently from Heidegger to pick out a certain qualitative character of some emotions.