I am a 3rd year Ph.D. student at the Central European University of Vienna. I received my BA in Philosophy at the University of Turin (Italy) in 2015 and in 2017 my MA, also in Philosophy, at the University of Milan-San Raffaele (Italy). I currently work under the supervision of Tim Crane and Katalin Farkas.
My research project investigates the contrast between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of cognition. I begin by defending the phenomenological datum that paradigmatically perceptual states have a distinctive kind of phenomenology that marks them from paradigmatically cognitive states, and vice versa – and such contrast is manifest to the subject. Then, the discussion divides into two parts. The first half is a criticism of those theories that draw the perception/cognition divide based on some content-level differences between perceptual and cognitive states. I argue that such content-level differences, even when true, do not explain the phenomenological datum. In the second I argue that the phenomenological datum can be explained by a contrast between different attitudes. Inspired by Husserl, I argue that a phenomenal state is individuated (at least partly) by its attitude, i.e., the phenomenal ‘manner’ of presentation of its objects. This phenomenology criterion can be used to draw the cognition/perception divide.