My main philosophical interest is in the philosophy of mind, specifically in the metaphysics of consciousness.
In my thesis, I argue that physicalism, which is the currently most popular position in the philosophy of mind, is false. Moreover, I argue that panpsychism, which is a rising alternative to physicalism, is also false. I do this by raising different explanatory gap worries against both of these views. Against physicalism, I argue that even if explanatory gaps are abundant, the explanatory gap between the physical and the experiential facts is special. Against panpsychism, I argue that panpsychists face an under-discussed explanatory gap involving the physical structure of reality.
The conclusion of my thesis is not entirely negative. I argue that although neither physicalism nor panpsychism can solve the problem of consciousness, the Russellian framework used by many panpsychists should not be rejected. I suggest that the Russellian framework, in conjunction with a non-panpsychist theory of fundamental reality, could be the way forward in solving the problem of consciousness.