Damian Aleksiev

Year of Enrollment: 

My main philosophical interest is in the philosophy of mind, specifically in the metaphysics of consciousness.

In my thesis, I argue that physicalism, which is the currently most popular position in the philosophy of mind, is false. Moreover, I argue that panpsychism, which is a rising alternative to physicalism, is also false. I do this by raising different explanatory gap worries against both of these views. Against physicalism, I argue that even if explanatory gaps are abundant, the explanatory gap between the physical and the experiential facts is special. Against panpsychism, I argue that panpsychists face an under-discussed explanatory gap involving the physical structure of reality.

The conclusion of my thesis is not entirely negative. I argue that although neither physicalism nor panpsychism can solve the problem of consciousness, the Russellian framework used by many panpsychists should not be rejected. I suggest that the Russellian framework, in conjunction with a non-panpsychist theory of fundamental reality, could be the way forward in solving the problem of consciousness.


MA in Philosophy, Central European University
BA in Philosophy, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje