It has been recognized “I think a is F”, considered as a predicative statement, is peculiar. The peculiarity comes out, for example, in Moore’s paradox: “a is F; but I do not think it is.” This statement appears afflicted by an inner tension. But when “I think a is F” is a predicative statement, then it is hard to discern a tension in what is said in “a is F; but I do not think it is”. Hence its appellation “paradox”. The correlative statement “X thinks a is F” appears to be free from peculiarity. There seems to be no tension in “A is F; but X thinks it is not”. Hence, lining up “I think a is F” with “X thinks a is F”, we can sustain our understanding of the former as a predicative statement. – This lecture will bring out that “X thinks a is F” is, if anything, even more peculiar, and that, should we have been inclined to think of “I think a is F” as a predicative statement, consideration of “X thinks a is F” must disabuse us of this idea.