

9th In-House Philosophy Graduate Conference
OPEN TO PUBLIC – CEU Philosophy Dept., Nador u. 15 Room 202 & 203

Friday (November 4 th , 2016)		
	Room N15 202	Room N15 203
10:00 – 10:50	<i>Keep calm and carry on: Sextus Empiricus on the origins of Pyrrhonism</i> Mate Veres (Chair: Istvan Bodnar)	
11:00 – 11:50	<i>The object of phantasia - Alexander of Aphrodisias</i> Attila Hangai (Chair: Istvan Bodnar)	<i>Epistemic asymmetries, 'architectural' principles, and the web-metaphor - How to understand constitutive principles under scientific pluralism</i> Michele Luchetti (Chair: Maria Kronfeldner)
Coffee break		
12:10-13:00	<i>Knowledge of the Posture and Movements of One's Body</i> Ehsan Shafiee (Chair: Hanoch Ben-Yami)	<i>Kant's Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism</i> Alin-Paul Varciu (Chair: Ferenc Huoranszki)
Lunch Break		
15:00-15:50	<i>Habit Acquisition and the Mind-Body Problem</i> James Cartlidge (Chair: Mike Griffin)	<i>A Case against Philosophers' Hallucinations (and Sense-Data)</i> Marius Jakstas (Chair: Hanoch Ben-Yami)
16:00-16:50	<i>Berkeley's voluntarist conception of nature</i> David Bartha (Chair: Mike Griffin)	<i>Fixing the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory</i> Garrett Mindt (Chair: Ferenc Huoranszki)
Coffee break		
17:10-18:40	Keynote Address Maria Kronfeldner (CEU) <u>Time to stop talking about human nature?</u> (Room: N15, Quantum 101)	
19:00	Welcome to New Students and Wine Reception	

	Saturday (November 5th, 2016)	
	Room N15 202	Room N15 203
<i>10:00 – 10:50</i>	<i>A Defence of Having Children</i> Andrew Pearson (Chair: Simon Rippon)	
<i>11:00 – 11:50</i>	<i>Why not Smilansky's Fundamental Dualism?</i> Gabor Tasnadi (Chair: Andres Moles)	<i>Problems of HOT Theory of Consciousness: Misrepresentation</i> Caglan Cinar Dilek (Chair: Howard Robinson)
	Coffee break	
<i>12:10 – 13:00</i>	<i>The Human Right to Care</i> Marko Konjovic (Chair: Emma Bullock)	<i>Is the mind really nonmodular?</i> David Bitter (Chair: Philip Goff)
	Lunch Break	
<i>14:40 – 15:30</i>	<i>Did Spinoza disperse the cloud over the mind of Maimonides?</i> Zsofia Gode (Chair: David Weberman)	Brute Regularities in answer to Counterfactual Grounding Problem for Phenomenalism Melvin Freitas (Chair: Philip Goff)
<i>15:40 – 16.30</i>	<i>Fiction Cannot Be True</i> Laszlo Kajtar (Chair: David Weberman)	
<i>19:00</i>	Dinner	

Abstracts:

Keynote Address

Maria Kronfeldner

Time to stop talking about human nature?

The concept of human nature is currently under much debate in philosophy of science: on the one hand it has been criticized for relying on outdated essentialist thinking and on the other hand it has been criticized for facilitating dehumanization. This paper aims to elevate the discussion about this contested concept to a new level. At issue is: is it time to stop talking about human nature, given the anti-essentialist critique and the dehumanization critique, or is revision of the concept and redefinition of the term 'human nature' enough? I will assume that a revisionist proposal needs to free the concept not only from outdated essentialist baggage but also from its dehumanizing potential, in order to be convincing in face of both critiques. A revisionary proposal also needs to show that the resulting revised concept should be called a concept of 'human nature', i.e., that the old terminology should be kept attached to the revised concept. This talk presents a set of novel arguments that show that the prospects for revisionary proposals are dim. It agrees with revisionary proposals that there is a set of post-essentialist concepts of human nature that make sense in face of the anti-essentialist consensus in philosophy of science. But it argues against revisionary proposals at the level of the terminology to be used. It will be argued that the price of eliminating the term 'human nature' for describing matters of fact is low. It will also be argued that (even though complete 'neutralizing' of the concept of human nature with respect to dehumanization is unlikely to be successful) eliminating essentialism and the term 'human nature' is likely to minimize dehumanization. On that basis the thesis is that getting rid of the term 'human nature' should be treated as a regulative ideal, if all one looks is, first, the price of eliminating the term for describing matters of facts and, second, the prospective positive effect of doing so for minimizing dehumanization. This result involves showing that the issue about elimination and revision is value-laden (rather than reducible to matters of fact). It thus involves complex trade-offs of epistemic and social values, trade-offs that can only be solved pragmatically.

Graduate Talks

David Bartha

Berkeley's voluntarist conception of nature

As is well known, Berkeley saw the contemporary developments of science as one of the main causes of the spread of scepticism, materialism and atheism. It is less known, however, in what his positive conception of nature consists. In my talk, first I will analyse Berkeley's doctrine that nature is a divine language, implying that it is not a self-standing realm of causal relations, but the immediate manifestation of God's communication with us. For Berkeley—as for the traditional, i.e. pre-Humean concept—causality has to be a necessary relation, so the denial of causal power to the perceptions constituting nature is an important part of depriving nature of any necessary relations. The doctrine of continuous creation endorsed by Berkeley also reinforces that nature has no independent existence and causal power of God's will. While these might be compatible with an occasionalist interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy of nature, I will show that Berkeley's understanding of the laws of nature as the mere generalizations of God's volitions, and his emphatic denial of eternal truths, commit him to a stronger, i.e. voluntarist, conception of nature and the complementing empiricist method of investigating it. On the voluntarist account I propose, nature does not exist in the mind of God in an archetypal form either, but is only what God wills us to experience, excluding any imperceptible entities (like atoms), but including those perfectly comprehensible internal mechanisms that are necessary for the predictability of nature contributing, ultimately, to our wellbeing.

David Bitter

Is the mind really nonmodular?

On the classical view of modularity (Fodor, 1983), relatively low-level perceptual and linguistic processes are typically effectuated by modular input systems, whereas paradigmatic cognitive processes like thinking and belief fixation are typically effectuated by nonmodular central systems. As originally construed, modular systems typically exhibit a cluster of nine properties, and it is in virtue of these properties that such systems constitute a natural kind. In his all-out attack on any version of modularity, Prinz (2006) argues to the contrary that, on the one hand, neither input nor central systems are modular on any of Fodor's criteria; and, on the other hand, there is little reason to think that the proposed properties ever fully cluster. My talk challenges such antimodularist reasoning on both qualitative (theoretical) and quantitative

(statistical) grounds. A possible theoretical upshot is that the currently available empirical evidence is yet insufficient for a final verdict on classical Fodorian modularity. More importantly, and even if such evidence is in principle available, a crucial methodological moral is that a compelling refutation of the classical view, if possible, will require more rigorous argumentation than has apparently been provided so far.

James Cartlidge

Habit Acquisition and the Mind-Body Problem

Habit is a relatively uncommon topic to hear discussed in philosophical terms, but one that receives much attention from French philosopher Felix Ravaisson in his 1838 doctoral thesis *Of Habit*. There he constructs a whole metaphysical system with habit as its central principle, one that takes into account not just human consciousness but the natural realm, basically arguing that everything can be explained in terms of habit. This presentation will focus on one aspect of his system, namely that an interesting potential answer to the mind-body problem can be drawn from it, specifically from its arguments concerning habit acquisition. Ravaisson argues that if we look at what habit is, how habits are acquired and what happens when they are, we can deduce the continuity of mind and body, challenging the way the mind-body distinction has been previously understood, thus dissolving the mind-body problem. Here I aim to reconstruct and consider this argument.

Caglan Cinar Dilek

Problems of HOT Theory of Consciousness: Misrepresentation

For Rosenthal there is a hard problem of consciousness only if we equate consciousness with mentality and consider consciousness to be omnipresent in our mental life. On the contrary, he situates consciousness with his Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory in a naturalistic framework by distinguishing intentionality and consciousness. The latter is explained through showing how a mental state becomes conscious, rather than explaining the consciousness of the subject. Accordingly, a mental state becomes intransitively conscious, if it is represented by a higher-order thought in a non-inferential (and immediate) way. The mental state does not have the intrinsic quality of consciousness because it is experiential; rather consciousness emerges extrinsic to the mental state-to-be-conscious. Criticisms against HOT Theory are based on all of the notions used at this explanation, such as the ‘extrinsicness’ of consciousness (that it is based outside of the conscious mental state) and ‘immediateness’ and ‘non-inferentiality’ of HOT, and these led to different formulations of Higher-Order and Self-Representational Approaches.

In this talk, I will be mostly dealing with the problem of ‘misrepresentation’, because its analysis enables us to treat different problems at the same time: How does the theory explain the possibility that a second-order mental state might misrepresent the first-order (FO) mental state or the object of the FO mental state? If the second-order (SO) mental state has the sole determining power on the overall quality of experience,

this is highly problematic, as FO mental state turns to be useless and the difference between a normal conscious experience and misrepresented experience seems to disappear. On the other hand, if the FO mental state can still determine the quality of the overall experience in the case of misrepresentation, HOT Theory might turn into a One-Level Account of Consciousness (especially a Self-Representational Theory) and it will be lacking its main virtue of giving an extrinsic explanation of consciousness. And if we deny the possibility of misrepresentation in a world HOT Theory works, we will again need to prefer a One-Level Account in the end, because it might better explain the impossibility of the occurrence of misrepresentation by considering the relation between FO and SO mental states as necessary. I will investigate to see whether there is any way out for HOT Theory.

Melvin Freitas

Brute Regularities in answer to Counterfactual Grounding Problem for Phenomenalism

Phenomenalism is the view that (i) the direct objects of perception are mind-dependent objects and (ii) that there are no mind-independent physical objects. One challenge for phenomenalism comes from its apparent failure to account for both the persistence and predictable behavior of ordinary physical objects. If our experience of physical objects is to be understood solely in terms of mind-dependent objects, what's to account for the continued existence and regular behavior of chairs, rocks, and washing machines when, for instance, they have been unperceived? In this chapter, I attempt to ground the truth of experiential counterfactuals about physical objects in the regularities of our experience on a model from the metaphysics of causation. Strawson has argued that one cannot explain causation solely in terms of regularity since that would entail that causal connections are all grounded in a miraculous "cosmic coincidence" between causes and effects. Beebe, however, has questioned the implicit demand that "an adequate ontology postulate something-in-virtue-of-which-the-universe-is-regular." For instance, she argues that it might be "a brute, primitive fact about the universe that it is pervaded by regularities" so that nothing like 'natural necessity' is required for the truth of our causal claims. Applying an analogous argument to the grounding problem, I question the need for an explanation of the regularities of our experience of physical objects. In other words, in defense of phenomenalism, I will attempt to ground experiential counterfactuals in the regularities of our experiences by taking such regularities to be brute primitive facts about the world.

Zsofia Gode

Did Spinoza disperse the cloud over the mind of Maimonides?

While Spinoza still exists in the public imaginary – insofar as he exists there at all – as an avowedly modern thinker, he proclaims in the *Ethics* that "some of the Hebrews" had glimpsed the true nature of God "as if through a cloud," which he himself, of course, saw clearly and

distinctly. Spinoza's comments may have been humble or haughty, or in any case intentionally misleading about the actual thickness of that cloud. In this talk I intend to explore the merits of the idea, famously put forward by Shlomo Pines and Warren Harvey, that it was Maimonides in particular who was, as it were, a cloud away from Spinoza's conception of God.

Harvey in his seminal 1980 article, "A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," sketched a framework in which Maimonides not only played a pedagogically significant role in the young Baruch's education, but had a distinctive influence on the thought of the mature Benedictus as well. In fact, his most controversial and daring claim was that Spinoza's God was Maimonides's together with the attribute of extension. Harvey, however, put forward the view in a fairly rudimentary way, identifying similar fundamental concepts and structures of thought rather than offering detailed argumentation. Carlos Fraenkel, in many respects a follower of Harvey, has helpfully filled in the gaps and it will be his paper on the subject that will feature as the main point of reference for my talk.

Marius Jakstas

A Case against Philosophers' Hallucinations (and Sense-Data)

I contend that the argument from Philosophers' Hallucinations, used by Howard Robinson to demonstrate the existence of sense-data, presupposes the truth of the mechanistic understanding of the brain. The reason why this is important from the philosophical point of view is that the mechanistic paradigm *need not* be true, and if Robinson's reasoning does depend on it in the way I suggest, then his argument falls short of providing independent grounds for us to believe in sense-data. However, assuming I am right, the consequences of my argument for the philosophy of perception do not end here. The possibility of hallucinations that are subjectively indiscriminable from perceptions is arguably at the heart of the main debates in the philosophy of perception. And if the alleged theoretical possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations is indeed circumscribed by the mechanistic paradigm, then theorists who consider hallucinations to be a threat to the epistemology of perception or use the possibility of hallucinations as an uncontroversial premise in an argument for the existence of subjective phenomenal experience have far less to go on with than is often supposed. I will explain why. I will conclude by considering just what kind of occultism about the workings of the brain my position commits me to, and if we need to think of it in those terms. (No we don't.)

Laszlo Kajtar

Fiction Cannot Be True

According to the dominant theory of intentionalism, fiction and non-fiction are in a “mix-and-match” relationship with truth and falsity: both fiction and nonfiction can be either true or false. Intentionalists hold that fiction is a property of a narrative that is intended to elicit not belief but imagination or make-belief in virtue of the audience’s recognizing that such is the intention of the fiction-maker. They claim that in unlikely circumstances these fictions can turn out to be accidentally true. On the contrary, I argue in this paper that fictionality and truth are incompatible. I distinguish narratives based on whether they contain invented characters or not, and offer respective sets of arguments to the effect that there is no case when a fiction is accidentally true. A narrative is either fiction or accidentally true but not both.

Marko Konjovic

The Human Right to Care

Although current debates about human rights emphasize vital, economically driven, needs for food, shelter, health care, and basic education as well as various civil and political rights that citizens ought to enjoy, little or no attention is given to the equally fundamental need for care. More generally, debates about economic, and civil and political rights ignore the extent to which these rights are inextricable from, and dependent on, protection of the need for care. In this paper, thus, I aim to begin filling in this gap: namely, I wish to argue that there is such a thing as *the human right to care*.

There are a number of *foundational* concerns regarding the idea that there is such a thing as the human right to care; I shall not, however, pretend to answer all of them in this paper. Instead, I will focus on two critical issues: (i) the nature of and (ii) the grounds of human rights. The central idea of human rights is that they are important normative protections that all people have. However, two germane questions emerge. One issue is: “Where do these rights come from?” That is, when we claim that something is a human right, what kind of rights are we talking about? Second, what justifies something being a human right? The grounds of human rights should justify the main features of human rights including, at minimum, their mandatory character, universality, and high priority.

In this paper I consider each question in turn. I first consider two main ways of thinking about the existence of human rights – the moral and the political approach – and argue that we are better off siding with the former view. I shall then proceed to consider various manners in which

the moral conception is developed; that is, I will examine some of the most influential ways in which proponents of this approach ground human rights.

Michele Luchetti

Epistemic asymmetries, 'architectural' principles, and the web-metaphor - How to understand constitutive principles under scientific pluralism

As it is well known, Quine (1951) rejected the traditional logical empiricist analytic/synthetic distinction, in favour of a holistic epistemology of science, captured by the metaphor of a 'web of belief' and based on the notion of entrenchment. Quine's rejection has often been the polemic target of philosophers who attempted to preserve a meaningful a priori/a posteriori distinction (e.g. Putnam 1976, 1978; Brittan 1978). According to most contemporary constitutivist perspectives on science, some principles in a theory function as preconditions for the formulation and empirical testing of other parts of the theory. Therefore, these views directly reject or criticise Quine's holism, in that it does not have the resources to accommodate the epistemic asymmetries between different components of scientific theories (Friedman 2001, Stump 2003, 2015).

In this talk, I will outline a number of criticisms to Quine's perspective, and I will aim at clarifying that rejecting Quine's alternative to the analytic/synthetic distinction does not straightforwardly lead to an endorsement of a picture based on (temporarily) universal constitutive principles as argued by Friedman (2001). Instead, it can more plausibly lead to an attempt of making sense of the epistemic asymmetries at the level of theories and components of theories, while allowing for the possibility of a plurality of constitutive principles.

I conclude by suggesting an alternative approach to constitutive elements in science. This approach is more in line with recent trends in philosophy of science focusing on scientific practices and on a pragmatic interpretation of scientific theories, which gesture towards a notion of 'constitutive' that overcomes the hegemonic character of Friedman's principles, and is more in line with a pluralistic perspective on science (Chang 2008, 2009, Mormann 2012).

Garrett Mindt

Fixing the 'Information' in Integrated Information Theory

Giulio Tononi's proposed theory of consciousness – Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness – presents an interesting advance in the scientific study of consciousness. Tononi suggests that consciousness is quantifiable in both quantity and quality in terms of

integrated information. Accordingly, information is one of IIT's two foundational pillars (alongside integration) and if one such pillar were to fall, the theory would have little to stand on. I argue that IIT is committed to a physicalist notion of information. Because of this, IIT suffers from a number of objections commonly directed against physicalist accounts of consciousness. Furthermore, I argue that this commitment to a physicalist notion of information is in direct conflict with how the theory is developed and against some of the motivating reasons given to argue the theory. The damage, thus, is two-fold. Firstly, in its present form IIT exhibits an internal incoherence in adhering to a position of consciousness it was designed to stay neutral on, i.e., physicalism. Secondly, this fact strips IIT of its purported novel ability to avoid the objections that plague rival theories of consciousness. Once I have shown that IIT is committed to a physicalist account of information and falls victim to these objections, I move on to give a tentative response on behalf of IIT for solving these problems. My response is a recommendation that IIT amend its definition of information in light of considerations of David Chalmers (1996) and Fred Dretske (1981).

Andrew Pearson

A Defence of Having Children

In his 2006 book *Better Never to have Been*, David Benatar produces various arguments for the surprising conclusion that coming into existence is nearly always harmful, and can never be beneficial. I will show that these arguments rest on a variety of shaky intuitions, and in particular upon a tendency among humans to place undue weight upon the more vividly imagined consequences of our actions. We should instead judge coming into existence to be a harm only if it leads to a life that is not worth living.

Ehsan Shafiee

Knowledge of the Posture and Movements of One's Body

We can typically tell what posture our body is in without having to look at it. Also, when we are moving a part of our body, or when a part of it is moving or being moved, we can tell that without having to observe it. It is commonplace to suppose that it is on the evidence of one's sensations that one is inclined to think as one does as to what posture one's body is in or whether a part of it is in motion. I shall argue that sensations could not have the evidential role they are commonly supposed to have, since it is one's being inclined to think as one does as to what posture one's body is in or whether a part of it is in motion which determines whether one knows these things, no matter what sensations, if any, one might be having while being so inclined.

Katsiaryna Suryna

What does strongly naturalized phenomenology achieve in cognitive sciences?

A number of recent phenomenologists claim that phenomenology should be appreciated as a form of transcendental philosophy and yet it can draw on the data from cognitive sciences. On the other hand, there is a growing interest, among cognitive scientists, in phenomenology. The prospects of an improving interaction between phenomenology and cognitive science partly depend on the issue of adjustment of phenomenology to the naturalistic framework of cognitive science. I distinguish between the strong and weak naturalization and focus on neurophenomenology and front-loaded phenomenology as two examples of the strongly naturalized phenomenology. Based on that I show that the strongly naturalized phenomenology makes up a zero-interaction between phenomenology and cognitive science since phenomenology thus naturalized functions no better than other introspective methodologies.

Gábor Tasnádi

Why not Smilansky's Fundamental Dualism?

In my presentation I attempt to reconstruct how Saul Smilansky, in his Fundamental Dualist account, tries to synthesize both compatibilism and hard determinism. I focus on the role he offers for the libertarian conception of free will, and on his pursuit to reconcile it with compatibilism. I argue that his project is unsuccessful, because 1) his arguments for the ethical basis of hard determinism are fragile, and 2) the role of libertarian free will becomes redundant in his Fundamental Dualism.

To this end, I reconstruct Smilansky's position, focusing on the ethical foundations he sees for compatibilism and hard determinism. Smilansky sees an equal ethical basis for both compatibilism and hard determinism and aims to combine the true insights of both sides in his Fundamental Dualism. I claim that we should understand this "synthesis" as us having both pro tanto reasons to blame and punish others and pro tanto reasons not to blame and punish them. In order to see the all-things-considered picture we have to weigh these reasons against each other.

Finally, I present my critique of his position. I claim that the ethical significance of libertarian free will in Smilansky's account is considerably weaker than the compatibilist ethical basis (mainly because of Smilansky's incoherentist commitments). Furthermore, I argue that even if he could find a convincing way to show the true ethical insights of hard determinism, he cannot reconcile them with the compatibilist insights. Thus, his project to reconcile the true insights of both compatibilism and incompatibilism fails.

Alin-Paul Varciu

Kant's Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

I will reconstruct the conceptualist-nonconceptualist debate in Kant starting from how the two camps interpret the threefold synthesis of imagination presented in the A edition Transcendental Deduction. The nonconceptualist readings offered by Lucy Allais and Robert Hanna have been assuming that because synthesizing (done by imagination) is not the same as conceptualizing (done solely by understanding), we should be able to say that imagination operates solely in sensibility, and thus the products of imagination are intuitions without conceptual content. The worry about this (as expressed by Hannah Ginsborg's weaker type of conceptualism) is its neglecting the fact that the products of the *transcendental* imagination should have both a part belonging to understanding, and one belonging to sensibility, and that without the transcendental imagination's relation to understanding, the *empirical* imagination couldn't form its own products. Hence both the empirical and transcendental imagination should have some kind of conceptual content. I will examine the response the nonconceptualists could give to this and will try to see whether it is the case that Kant's theory of the threefold synthesis can support claims from both camps, as it is suggested in Hanna's rather pretentious claim that "Kant's theory of intuition is the hidden historical origin of both sides of the contemporary debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists" ("Kant and Nonconceptual Content", 2005, 251).

Mate Veres

Keep calm and carry on: Sextus Empiricus on the origins of Pyrrhonism

In the first book of his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (PH), Sextus Empiricus offers a general account of Pyrrhonian scepticism as a kind of philosophy. On a familiar reading, the Sextan project of reconciling the position described with the aspiration to offer a *philosophical* choice faces several difficulties. Most importantly, as various objections go, becoming a mature Pyrrhonian sceptic makes one unmotivated or even unable to genuinely engage in the kind of truth-oriented inquiry that is specific to any philosophy worthy of the name.

In this paper, I develop a strategy to preempt any such charge in the following way. First, I offer a close reading of Sextan passages – especially his discussion of the "principles" (ἀρχαί, PH I. 12) and the "goal" (τέλος, PH I. 25-30) of Pyrrhonism – which hint at the personal journey of an inquirer transforming into a mature Pyrrhonian. Second, I show that on this reading, Pyrrhonian need not lose their original motivation to inquire, rather they are in fact Pyrrhonian by virtue of continuing the search they have originally engaged in.

This narrative is significant for a number of reasons. First, it highlights several steps involved in the journey towards the recognition of equipollence. Second, it alludes in various ways to the motivation as well as the character of inquirers, thereby providing explanation for their respective decisions in the face of equipollence. Third, in aligning the achievement of a sceptical disposition with the experience the painter Apelles is said to have undergone, it brings out key features of the notions of tranquility and suspension of judgement involved in such a disposition. Finally, it simultaneously offers an account of the emergence of the first generation of sceptics as a philosophical community.

The story offered by Sextus describes the interplay of two principles of scepticism, the "originative" (αἰτιώδης) and the "constitutive" (συστάσεως) ἀρχή, and in outline goes as follows. People of an inquisitive nature set out to investigate conflicts of appearances in the hope of coming to a specific kind of decision (ἐπικρίνειν), but came to recognise the equipollence of opposing arguments instead. Different inquirers responded differently to this recognition: while some have settled for a less than satisfactory answer, others – the sceptics – have persevered in their inquiry and are unwilling to assent rashly to any view.

With this background, I shall provide a comparative analysis of the analogy between the case of Apelles and that of the Pyrrhoneans. I will argue that the similarity holds not with regard to the experience of each and every individual suspension, but rather with regard to the acquisition of a genuinely sceptical disposition. The Apelles analogy is meant to describe the moment when the first counterexample is discovered to the universal claim that there can be no tranquility without getting it right, and does not support a reading on which sceptics come to reject the project of philosophical inquiry. I end by pointing to textual clues about why a Pyrrhonean would not rule out eventual discovery.