I'm currently working on my PhD in philosophy at CEU. In my dissertation, I defend the direct realism of perception. My strategy is to argue against all the rivals. I have argued that the argument from illusion doesn't work because it is possible that physical objects and properties are directly perceived even if sense-data were admitted. Moreover, the phenomenal principle relies on a specific reading of appear words, which I argue will either makes the whole argument inconsistent or completely trivial. I also argue that the intentionalism is unable to address the argument from hallucination. For the intentional content as an abstract proposition fails to be adequate to the phenomenal experience. But if the intentional content is supposed to be another category, the 'veil' problem may come back, which will make the intentionalism no better than sense-datum theory. In addition, I also argue that the arugment from accuracy cannot support the intentionalism either, since it's possible that an incoherent content will be read off from the way that an object appears to the subject. Many works are still waiting to be done.
Besides my dissertation, I have written a paper on truthmaker, where I argue that statements can be true or false for different reasons, so a pluralism should be insisted on and the maximalism must be gone. Related with the paper on truthmaker, I'm also working on a paper about fictional characters, where I argue that fictional characters does not really exist, but statements about them can be true or false, which depends on what the author wrote. I have also written papers on free will and action (levels of free will, non-causal theory of action)